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DUTCH FAITH: 5

BEING AN
ENQUIRY,

Founded on FACTS,

Into the Probability of the Success of
the *British* ARMS, on the Conti-
nent, next Campaign.

With Considerations on the present STATE of
Parties in *England*.

To which is annex'd,

A COPY of the ARTICLES, present-
ed to his M——y by a certain Embassa-
dor, against the British F——d M——l, with
his Answer to the same.



L O N D O N:

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(Price, One Shilling.)

DISCUSSION

BEING AN

ENQUIRY

Into the Probability of the Success of

the British Arms, on the Continent, next Campaign.

With Considerations on the present State of
the European Empire.

By John A. Roebuck, Esq.

A Copy of this Pamphlet
has been presented
to his Majesty's
Parliament, and
his Answer to the same.



L O N D O N

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
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DUTCH FAITH:

B E I N G

An Enquiry, founded on Facts, into the Probability of the Success of the *British* Arms, on the Continent, next Campaign, &c.



I HOPE it will be deem'd neither officious nor insolent in an *English* Officer, who has somewhat besides his Sword, which he can call his own, to give his Sentiments upon this Crisis, so interesting to every Man of Property, so decisive of our National Concerns. I shall endeavour to do it with that Plainness of Heart and Language, which becomes a Gentleman and a Soldier, regardless of Offence *taken*, as none is meant to be *given*.

A 2

During

During the late Opposition to the Measures of our M^{rs}, I heartily wished it Success, but upon very different Principles from those, which the Gentlemen who carried it on have since avow'd, nay very different from those they avow'd then. It was not because *Hanoverians* were employ'd in our Pay; it was not because *France* was not a Power, which ought to be equally the Object of our Dread and Aversion; it was not because I thought *Great Britain* was not interested in supporting the House of *Austria*. I wish'd the Opposition Success, because, for Reasons which could suggest to no Minister or Member not in the Field, I saw the whole of the War must lye upon the Shoulders of *Great Britain*, a Weight which must press her down in time to *Insignificancy*, if not to *Ruin*. But I wish'd the Gentlemen in the Opposition doubly Success, when I perceiv'd, that to this Weight was added another, which clog'd all our Operations, which chain'd us down to acting not only against our *Interest*, but our *Honour*; and damp'd a Spirit, which

which however ineffectual, still shew'd us to be *Britons*: The Weight I mean was that of an insidious Pe----, sent to us rather as Spies than Allies, rather as *Cloggs to our Counsels*, than *Assistants to our Arms*.

This was the fatal Error which dragg'd the late M----- from his Seat of Power, which he wou'd have fill'd with more Lustre than any *English* Minister ever did, had his *Support* been as faithful, as his *Measures* were vigorous. His Maxims were certainly right but too general, and without Allowances to those Effects of private Connections, which now have greatly chang'd the Genius of that Republic, from what it was at the Commencement of the last War. On this Rock he split; cou'd he have weather'd it, his Administration would have been more glorious than even that of the great *Godolphin*, because attended with more dreadful Effects to *France*. But he became the Dupe of his own Designs; *Eagerness of wishing* brought him into *Easiness of Belief*, and he was deceiv'd by a People, to whom every Tye of Honour, Gratitude and Interest

ought

ought to have dictated other Measures and better Faith.

During the Heat of the late Opposition, the Improbability, nay Impossibility of the *Dutch* joining offensively with *England* was loudly proclaim'd. The M——r who directed, or was suppos'd to direct our foreign Affairs, was sensible, that without their Concurrence, it was ruinous to *Britain* to carry on the War by Land; he undertook in Person to bring them in; an evasive Management on their Side was seen thro', and eccho'd all over the Nation by the *Broadbottom* and their Friends. This very Clamour for ought I know, as much as any thing else, intimidated the *Dutch* from joining us, since they cou'd not depend upon an *English* Administration, which had not the People on its Side. Nay the Gentlemen of the Opposition even went so far, as to lay it down an incontestible Maxim both in their Speeches and Writings, that the War was in itself ruinous and ridiculous, and that *Great Britain* had no Business to concern herself with it, even tho'
she

she were join'd by *Holland*. Can any of
 the *Broadbottom'd* Patriots refuse this to
 have been their System of Doctrine? Did
 not they revive the Cry of *no War*, or if a
 War, *no Land War*, upon every favourable
 Turn which our Negotiations were likely
 to take in *Holland*? They did. And the
 Knowledge I had of the Behaviour and
 Sentiments of the *Dutch* made me applaud
 them. But how has the Scene chang'd?
 How many of the *Broadbottom'd* Gentlemen,
 since their coming into Places, have had
 the Honesty and Courage to espouse their
 former Principles upon this Head? Was
 not a Repetition of the Conduct of the late
 A——n the first Earnest the People had of
 the newly effected Change? Upon the Al-
 teration when the Earl of *Orford* resign'd
 his Places; did not the new Administration
 set out with sending into *Holland* a noble
 Earl, who the People imagin'd was in high
 Esteem and Popularity with the *Dutch*?
 But what his Success was, let their scanda-
 lous Conduct towards the End of that Year's
 Campaign tell.

Did

Did not the present *A—n* of the *Broad-bottoms* commence in the very same Manner, but with more improbable Views, and upon more ridiculous Grounds? Notwithstanding the repeated Breaches of Friendship, notwithstanding the scandalous Inactivity of that *Re—c*, another noble *L—d* is sent upon the same Errand, in which his Predecessors in the same Embassy had so often failed. I own I was pleas'd when I heard of the Measure of sending that *N---le L---d*, *whose Zeal against a Land War* had so eminently distinguish'd itself during the late Opposition. I imagin'd that *he was the People's Ambassador*. This was a Character which would have cloathed him with Lustre, and have recommended him to a State, to whom the Friendship of *England* ought to be so very valuable. But the very Means pretended to be taken, to distinguish him with that Character, depriv'd him of it, and it was immediately plain to the People of *England*, that he was gone upon an arrant *C—t* Jobb. To have preserv'd the Character of *the Peoples Ambassador*,

dor, it would have been necessary for those who sent him to have regain'd the People's Favour. But instead of that, as if they had been already sure of that Republic's Refusal, they went on in voting as many Troops as we cou'd have maintain'd, had the Weight of the War rested entirely on our selves. Was this the Way to reconcile the Favour of the People to the new Measures? No. It discovered that we were resolv'd, even previous to our Knowledge of what Answer the Republic would return, to plunge into a Land War more ruinous and more expensive than even that which had been so much curs'd and blam'd under the late A——

——n. Was this a proper Method to invite the *Dutch*? No; they or any other People would be mad to go to put themselves to Expences, to expose themselves to the Resentment of a powerful incens'd Neighbour, from whom they have every thing both to *hope* and to *fear*, when another People not immediately concern'd, were buckling on their Armour and drawing the Sword to fight the Battles of their Republic. The

B

Case

Case is common in private Life. There is a Subject in Dispute: Two Parties are, or think themselves concern'd in the Event, the one *immediately*, the other *remotely*. The Affair comes to a Law-suit, the Person *immediately* concern'd refuses to advance a Shilling, or at least to do any thing which may provoke the Antagonist, from whose Friendship or Enmity he expects a great deal. The Party *remotely* concern'd advances the Money necessary to be employ'd, and stakes even his private Credit to support the Expence. Where this is the Case, can we suppose that the other Party will contribute to a Charge which is defray'd to his Hand? No; he would be a Fool and a Madman if he did.

In short, our voting for all the Men and Money necessary to carry on a Land War, in which we are but *remotely* concerned, at our sole Expence, was of all things the greatest Encouragement for the *D--ch*, who are *immediately* concerned, not to stir a Step farther. At the same time they could not be insensible, that a Step of this Kind at
this

this Juncture, when the Public were in full Expectations of being reliev'd from that inconscionable Burthen, which had so long prest it, must of all others be the most disagreeable to the People of *England*. This effectually destroy'd the Character which the N—le L—d set out with of being *the People's Embassador*. In *Holland*, the Notions of the leading Men, as well as those of the Commonalty are, that the Measures of the P—t and those of the Government are the same. This Notion is founded upon what they have known P—ts do of late. Upon the inconsistent Treaties they have approved of, upon the disagreeable Measures they have supported, upon the invidious *Expedients* they have adopted, and the unpopular Steps they have taken. They have seen M—rs at the Head of a Majority in P—t sink under the Weight of popular Odium. They have seen both the C—t and P—t oblig'd to give up a M—ry, which was disagreeable to the People; they have perceived how an Opposition, tho' even faint, can clog the Wheels of public

B. 2

Measures,

Measures, and render an Ad——n backward and cautious of acting with that Vigour, which is absolutely necessary to beget Confidence. From all these Considerations, which are in *Holland* as well understood as they are here, the V——tes of P——t have but little Influence there.

That the Forms of Government will be dear to every wise and virtuous People, must be admitted. Hence it may be said, that the Sense of the *British* Nation is *the Sense of the King and Parliament*. — That is, there is no other immediate Organ by which this Sense can be declar'd, but by a King acting at the Head of his Parliament. But are we so childish, so raw, so foolish as to think, that the D——ch imagine the Sense of the K——g and P——t to be *always* the Sense of the *British* Nation. The Sense of the K——g and P——t is often declar'd upon Measures, which, many Persons not in P——t, in the Nation, never heard a Syllable of. The declar'd Sense of the Queen and Parliament was for the Treaty of *Utrecht*. Their declar'd Sense was to
censure

censure the brave General, to dispost the able Ministry, which had carry'd on a War that was upon the Point of humbling *France* beyond a Possibility of recovering. We knew the Sense of a Parliament which approv'd of a Convention. But where is the *Englishman* now, who can hold up his Face and say, that the Treaty of *Utrecht* was not an infamous Measure; I don't mean in closing the Scene of a War which was even in Conquest fatal to the Interest of *Britain*, but in not forcing *France* to give us better Terms, and in not obliging her to divest herself of many Advantages, both in Trade and Territory, which have since rear'd her Head, and given her Power enough again to bid an insolent Defiance to all *Europe*. Where is the Man that will now refuse that the Duke of *Marlborough* was an honest Man, and a successful General? Where is the *Englishman* now, who does not admit the infamous Convention with *Spain*, to have been big with Calamities greater than those which can possibly attend unsuccessful War? Yet all those inglorious,

glorious, ungrateful, ignoble Measures within our own Memory, have been approved of by P——t.

But when the Sanction of P——t was given to the Treaty of *Utrecht*, was there a Man in *Holland*, *Germany*, nay in *France* itself, who conceiv'd that Sanction to be the Sense of the Nation? When the Duke of *Marlborough* was censured, was there a Man in *Europe* who really believ'd he was guilty? When the Convention was approved of, was there an *Englishman* without Doors who did not detest it?

Were the Word Parliament of as fixt a Nature here, as *Government* is in other Places, there might indeed be some determin'd Standard, by which the Sense of the People of *England* might be known without consulting any Man in *England* out of P——t. But Thanks to Heaven, tho' the *Word* is fixt the *Thing* is not. Engagements with foreign Nations are not Things of a Day, a Week or a Year. Yet we have seen a Day, a Week or a Year bring strange Alterations in the Sense of P——t. But
without

without this Sense what Power will enter into Engagements with us? and *with* it, what Power will, when it is so *fluctuating*? But some may beweak enough to imagine, that this Argument proves too much, since it proves that none of our Neighbours will ever think themselves safe to trust us. No; the Sense of the People of *Great Britain* is as fixt as any Proposition in the Mathematicks. It is center'd in their *Interest*, a thing which a brave, free, understanding People as the *English* are, never can, never did mistake. When I speak of *Interest*, I speak too of *Honour* and *Reputation*; without them, national *Interest* can never subsist. —

Yet former Ministers have had the fascinating Power to suggest to their Sovereign, that a Change of Hands wou'd oyl the Wheels of Government, and facilitate its Operations. The Hands have been changed, but how have the People treated that Change where it was not attended by one of Measures? Why as Apostates, Runagates and Traytors. Even this Consideration which we have seen so often repeated,
within

within these few Years, ought to convince, I dare say it has convinc'd, all the Powers of *Europe*, that the People of *England* are a sensible, and as yet a free People. In what Light could we look upon a Man, who having a valuable Treasure to conceal, should bury it in the Fields, and take no Note of the Time and Place, when and where he left it, but that it was Moon-light and that the Shadow of a Tree but just reach'd the Spot where the Gold lay.--- He comes back in a Week or two, in a Year or two; perhaps the Tree is lopt or cut down; perhaps the Tree stands; but the Shadow won't answer.--- Just so wou'd a foreign Power act if upon the fashionable Shine of a Courtly, which has of late Years ever directed a P——y, Opinion, she should embark upon our Bottom, and expect to find the same Appearances to Day which it found Yesterday. But at the same time she would curse the Unsteadiness and Fluctuation of our Counsels, with no better Reason than the Fool would the Inconstancy of the Moon, and the Alteration of Situation, which

which had lost him his beloved Hoard. It is not Inconstancy in the People that betrays the one, no more it is Irregularity in the Moon that deceives the other; only both took their Notes by the Shadow, without studying the true System of the Substance.

I believe the Sense of the Nation of *England* never was so clear in any one Point, as it has been with regard to the Share we ought to have taken in the present War. There was not I dare to affirm, ten *Englishmen* in *Britain*, who did not wish the Government Success, and who did not imagine that the Time was now come, for our emancipating ourselves from the Power and Insolence of *France*, which during the late A——n had branded us with so many Marks of Infamy. If the *D--ch* had honestly and wisely caught the Crisis of this Ardour, they would have acted up to that Prudence, which ought to distinguish a free State, and to that Honour which should adorn a grateful People, rear'd by the Kindnesses, establish'd by the Cares, and sav'd by the Arms of the *British* Nation. But

so far was that Republic from any Returns of this Kind, that she acted as artful Prostitutes do by Cullies; she coquetted, she advanced, she dallied. Our Minister's Conduct was answerable. He thought all the Coyneſs of the Republic was but a timid Bashfulness which she would lay aside as soon as ever she was convinc'd that his Intentions were honourable; that the only Way to convince her was by entering on his Part upon indissoluble Engagements against his Rival, whom the Republic pretended to hold in utter Detestation. Still the Dame play'd her Part, repeated Assurances daily past, mutual Endearments were hourly bestow'd, and in short, all Marks of Affection and Love past betwixt her and our Minister except *fairly entering*, into vigorous offensive Measures. But so much was he infatuated, that he could not be convinc'd of her double Dealing. He drew the Engagements he had enter'd into still closer; at last, that which was at first only a Matter of *Choice*, became a *Measure of Necessity*. The Engagements which he had entred in-

to

to with *H-----r*, which, had the Republic come into the War, no Man in *England* would have thought too dear or impolitic, became indispensable with his own Safety, or even with that of the *English* Arms. All this Time the *D---b* knew his Distress, with the People of *England*; yet they basely took from him by their late Conduct, the only fair, the only reasonable Excuse, he could have for it; nay the only Measure, by which he could have reconcil'd his own Safety with the Interest of the Nation, and have prov'd that he had acted, if not with Success, at least with Honesty. They every Day declar'd their Readiness in Words, they every Hour shewed their Backwardness in their Deeds, in the Cabinet all *Fire*, in the Field all *Frost*, and while the most plausible Front was presented to the *English* People, they made Mouths at the *English* Army.

Such a Conduct I say took from our *M-----r* all Means of making this fair and frank Declaration to the Public; "I did
 "advise my Master, and I did it with the
 "Approbation of all the Kingdom, to en-

“ ter upon this War with all his Force. I
 “ advised the Parliament to undertake En-
 “ gagements, which I saw at the Time
 “ they were undertaken, could be justify’d
 “ only by Success; but I did all this upon
 “ a Presumption that the *Dutch* would de-
 “ clare themselves Principals in the War. I
 “ have try’d all Means, I have us’d all Ef-
 “ forts to perswade them, but in vain, it is
 “ time we should look to ourselves, we may
 “ by a little Perseverance in our Expence,
 “ upon the Faith of their fulfilling their
 “ Engagements, plunge ourselves too deep
 “ ever to recover; better retire while we
 “ may, before we irretrievable sink.”

Such undeniably was the State of our
 Affairs at the Close of the last Campaign.
 Had the *Dutch* been to be determined by
 Motives of Gratitude, Equity, or even ap-
 parent Interest, (if her Interest consists, as
 we think it does, chiefly in her Independency)
 she had in the last Campaign the fullest, the
 favourest Opportunity of acting with Vi-
 gour against *France*. Never can we hope
 for another Crisis, in which the Neck of
France

France was so much expos'd to the Swords of the Confederates, as it was, at the time when Prince *Charles* by the Assistance of our Money pass'd the *Rhine*: When all the Flower of the *French* Army was drawn down against him, and the Allies had only to cope with an Enemy, in their Numbers despicable, in their Situation expos'd, and in their Appointments miserable. If with so fine an Army and with such Advantages as we then had, our Allies could not be brought to strike, can we imagine that from any Alteration, which has happened in the System of Affairs in *Europe*, they have been encourag'd *since* to a more vigorous Conduct. But to return.

The People of *England* who were heartily, who were unanimously for a War with *France*, saw, that instead of the *D---b* our natural Friends, acting as generous Allies in the common Cause of *Europe*, we were only joined by the *H—s*, who came in upon the Footing of interested Mercenaries, and were represented as acting in the particular Quarrel of *H——r*. This was the Nature,
it

it was the true Aspect with which the War struck the People, who finding it prosecuted neither with Success nor Honour, grew loud and intractable. The M——r knew that Success was every Thing, and believ'd that the more he shewed himself in Earnest, the more readily the *Dutch* would declare themselves as Principals. Upon this Principle he enter'd into new Engagements, and gave fatal Proofs of his Sincerity, as well as dangerous ones of his Resolutions. For to demonstrate how much, his M——r and he too were determin'd to reduce *France*, he rejected the Propositions made at *Hannau*, tho' they were such, as the Enemy cou'd never since be brought to make, and such as must inevitably have united the Interests of the *Germanic* Princes, a Circumstance that never fails speedily to unite their Inclinations. He then found that the *Dutch* made some Objections to the unguarded Situation of his *Sardinian* Majesty, the Support of whose Power is of such infinite Consequence to their Republic. To remove their Fears, not only strong Supplies
of

of Ships, of Men and Money were dispatch'd for the Support of that Monarch, but a Treaty was made at *W--ms* teeming with Mischiefs, but such as were all retrievable, had the great System of determining the *Dutch* taken Place. The *Genoesse* however did not chuse *to trust*; and as the Stipulation in that Treaty which concerned them, was indefensible upon the Principles of natural Equity, the M——r was unsupported in it, both by the Friends of the G——t at Home, and the Al——s of the Nation abroad. The Miscarriage of this Treaty, or what was the same thing, the *cold Reception* it met with, from those whom it was design'd to serve, and the Inexecution of it open'd a fairer Field than ever, for his Enemies at Home as well as abroad, and gave a Handle for those, who had hitherto acted only as cold Friends, to declare themselves his determin'd Foes. The Nation till then, *and not till then* grew weary of the War, and then, *and not till then* the *Dutch* were justifiable in the cautious Part they acted. But this Justification arose from

from their own Backwardness, it was *that* which gave the Enemies of the M——r their Encouragement, and had it not been for that, all Opposition to his Conduct must have been struck dumb.

In this Situation were Measures, when the great Man was oblig'd to resign his Power, which he never held by any other Tenure than *eventual Success*, tho it must be own'd grounded upon more than Probability, had any Spark of that Spirit, which us'd to animate the Counsels of that Republic, still existed. The Gentlemen in the Opposition or rather those who adopted Opposition Schemes, to strengthen their own Interest in P——t, next took the Helm, but under the same fatal Delusion, that their Sense was the Sense of the Nation. It proved indeed, as every one foresaw it wou'd, the Sense of P——t. But how easy that is to be accounted for, let the following Considerations suffice.

Notwithstanding the great Change of the M——ry, when the Father of Corruption abandon'd his Post, yet it is certain little or

no Alteration happen'd in the Sense of P—
 —t. The M—rs who succeeded him
 never durst venture to turn out of Pay the
Swisses of the G---t, and the same Princi-
 ples upon which they were continued, were
 sufficient Reasons for believing they would
 remain the same, under all A——ns.
 The new M—ry, if it could be call'd so,
 was not deceiv'd. The Affair of the C—
 —tee of S—fy being compromis'd, a
 few Removals being made, and the same
 Measures agreed upon, the two Parties like
 Fire and Smoak incorporated together, and
 consolidated as much as if they had been
 originally the same. Venality being the
 common Principle of both, the Terms, the
 Price, the Conduct of both were easily
 known. The Genius of the M——r who
 came in upon the new Scheme, was not
 turn'd for Corruption. His Manner was
 too impetuous, his Maxims too general, for
 him to descend into the Minuteneſſes, which
 had ſo ſtrongly compacted the System of
 his Predeceſſor. He made too ſmall Al-
 lowances for a certain Degree of Pride,
 D which

which exists in the Breasts of the most groveling: He too much despis'd that Mechanism of Venality, which distinguish'd his Predecessor; He thought that as Corruption was the common Principle, every dirty Hand might convey the Bribe, which could never be unwelcome, however clumsily apply'd. In short he was out-witted by those, who were not Masters of the twentieth Part of his Genius or Knowledge, and a new Consolidation of Interests took Place, but without one Alteration from the common System of Corruption, or one *Deviation into Right*. The same infamous Tools who had spoken and voted for the old M——y, who had never deserted the late, and who form'd the Majority in all Majorities, were continued as the only Instruments, as indeed they were, which could be depended on, as the surest Props of P——ry Interest. Thus it happen'd that the new A——n have got in the first Place a M--j—y.

But it may be said, Matters were carried not only by a M———y, but almost with
Unanimity.

Unanimity. That too may be accounted for with as much Ease, as the M--j--y itself. For the late M---r's Schemes becoming abortive, as I have already prov'd by the Backwardness of the D---ch, he lost his M--j---y in the Cabinet, without having much Interest in either H---se. An Opposition from him *there* would therefore have been both impolitic and ineffectual. Impolitic, because he would have appear'd to have oppos'd the C---t Measures, which might have lost him all his Interest in the C-----t; and ineffectual, because weak. No Opposition could come from the old Or-----ns, who like the Vicar of *Bray*, seek only to keep what they have, be M-----r who will. None could come from the real virtuous uninfluenc'd Part of the P-----t, because they had a good Opinion of the Gentlemen who had just come in. They had many recent Proofs of their Public Spirit, and they were too lately come in, to give any Proofs of their Tergiversation. Unanimity in our Public Counsels immediately after such a Change, might have had

the very best Effect upon our Affairs abroad. It bade more fair than any other Measure for awing the Powers at War into a Peace, glorious, safe and advantageous for *Britain*; or determining our Allies to enter with vigour and Unanimity, if there was a melancholy Necessity for continuing the War. Those Considerations render'd it both wise and honest not to oppose from the Quarter of those, who were the Friends of their Country. Thus a very extraordinary Juncture happen'd, when a Measure of great Importance was carried by Unanimity, arising from different Motives.

But this Unanimity existed no longer than the political Mist was dispell'd. The Purposes for which it was so earnestly solicited were easily seen thro', and heartily detested. But Gentlemen had gone too far to remedy the Evil, which they had so uncautiously agreed to. Without Doors there was little Unanimity, and a few Days discover'd the whole Management. Our Enemies upon this took heart, and our A—es were discourag'd. The *French* pour'd their Troops
into

into *Germany*, which from the fatal Backwardness of the *D—b*, they were enabled to do with Speed and Safety. The more this Backwardness was encourag'd the more it became indispensable, and like certain Evils it begot its own Necessity.

Notwithstanding all this, it is more than probable that the *D—b* will at last declare War against the common Enemies of *Europe*. But whenever they shall take this Step, will it not proceed from their Terror of the *French* Arms, and not from their Affection to *E—d*, or their Regard to Treaties? But will it not be too late? May not their declaring at a Juncture, when nothing but their close Connection with *B—n* can save them from Ruin, weigh *B—n* down into a War more ruinous, calamitous and expensive, than could have happen'd when Success was doubtful, and the Finances, Fleets and Armies of both Powers full, numerous, and well appointed? Should the Activity of the *French* get the better, by having the Start in the Field, and now as they did last Year, fall upon and ruin their
Barrier,

Barrier, what a Scene of Labours have we to recommence, all which might have been sav'd, had they declar'd vigorously and in Time?

But besides those Considerations so alarming at this Juncture, may they not even declare War to please us, from whom they have so much both to hope and to fear, and yet manage it so, as they shall be under no great Terror of *France*, nor *France* of them. This may be look'd upon as an extravagant Suggestion, nor would I now have thrown it out, had I not had Opportunities and Experience of their Dispositions, which persuades me that my Fears are but too well grounded.

The shameful Inaction of last Campaign is Matter of Surprise to the World in general, and to us in particular, who contributed to the Expence. I am therefore glad that Chance has put it in my Power to convey a Hint to the Public to satisfy its Curiosity, or excite its Desire, to call for further Lights to unravel these dark Transactions; I mean a Vindication wrote by the late Commander of
the

the *British* Forces, from a Charge of the *Dutch* impeaching his Conduct. This I think of the more Importance to be communicated, as it not only teaches, whence flowed the *Misconduct of last Campaign*, but as it gives room to judge, what may be expected from the ENSUING. What other Reason can account for Objections so frivolous, as these after recited, but a Necessity the *Dutch* found themselves under to remove, by complaining, the Odium of these Transactions from themselves, to save themselves from the Resentment of their Allies, and more, from the Indignation of their own Subjects, zealous for asserting the common Cause, and to throw the whole on *Britain*, its chief Support. Determined to injure *France* as little as Auxiliaries, as Principals in the present War, they with-held their Troops the best Part of the Campaign, and restrained them the rest of it, and not daring entirely to break with *England*, or endanger their own Safety by exasperating their own Subjects, they artfully form Articles of Complaint against Marshal *W—de*, yet that these

Articles

Articles were intended but for a temporary Expedient, to stave off another Campaign, appears fully from their trifling Nature and trifling Consequence. But the Answer to them furnishes us with a Fact, which must prove my Suppositions not vain, and that is, that the *Dutch* Generals refused to put in Execution, a Scheme for attacking the Enemy, tho' of their own proposing, and only marched so far in Execution of it, till they got the Army into the Neighbourhood of *Ghent*, towards which they retired in search of Winter Quarters. Nor was the manner of obstructing this their Scheme, less remarkable than the thing itself, for tho' it was proposed to be executed in the Space of four or five Days without *halting*; yet at the very next Camp, that of *Frocerme*, two Days were lost, for which no possible Cause could be assign'd, but to give time to the *French* Body at *Pecque*, two Leagues off, to retire at Leisure to their Camp. Two Days more were thrown away at the next Ground of *Avelghem*, the sole apparent Cause of which, was to give time likewise to the *French*, who possessed *Deynse*,
to

to evacuate that Place, and retire to Count *Saxe* at *Courtrai*. Now the complaisant *French* had left us a Passage by a commodious Bridge, no reasonable Cause of Delay remain'd, and the rather as the heavy Baggage was sent away, that it might not impede the Expedition of the Army, yet at the next Camp, at *Petteghem*, we halted another Day, and then proceeded to the Plains of *Hugsen*, within a short March of *Deynse*. Then the Scene of Action was thought to be at hand, for the Army was ordered to be ready to march next Morning, but these Orders were contradicted in the Evening; and the next Day, and the following, the same Orders were given, and in the same Manner contradicted. At last without Shame, they barefacedly deserted their Scheme, their Allies, and the Field, retired precipitately to *Ghent*, and left Mr. *W--de* with the *English* and *Hanoverians*, within a March of the Enemy. But farther Particulars of this, Mr. *W--de* in his Answer to the fifth Article of Accusation, has mentioned in a manner too elegant and strong to be attempted after him. Have

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not

not we then all imaginable Reason to presume, that they who thus refused, to execute their own Scheme at the End of the Campaign, obstructed the Performance of those of others during its Continuance, and were Authors of the shameful Inaction of the whole. Does it not speak of itself, that the Obstructors of the *taking of Lisle*, and the Passage of the *Lis* at *Corminines* and *Werwick*, the Attack and the Defeat of *Saxe's* Army at *Courtrai*, could be only those, who refused to pass the same River at *Deynse*, in Consequence of their own Project. And indeed it is not by a reasonable Man to be conceived in another Light, for it is notorious, that Mr. *W--de*, pass'd the *Scheld*, in Consequence of repeated Orders *to fight at all Events*, and his known Courage and Honour leave out of Doubt his Inclination to execute these Orders. He knew fighting was the Interest of the Nation, and the Wish of the Army, and felt too much of the *Briton* and *Soldier* to resist the Call of *either*, much less of *both*. *A—rg*, however nominally complimented,

plimented, is well known to have little real Power, for his Eight Battalions could give him little, his Reasons and Dignity give him less. His thoughtless Hours were divided between the Bowl and the Pillow, or if ever his stupid Soul felt an enlightning Ray, it was but to think, how well the Contributions came in, or how the Frontiers of *Hainault* and the Lordship of *Enguien* were covered. The *Dutch* there alone were answerable, and the whole is consistent with the Conduct of *Holland* in general, to leave its Author in the Dark. For, to whom may we impute it with such Justice, as to those who looked tamely on the taking of *Menin*, *Ipres*, and *Furnes*, whose Substitutes in those Fortresses surrenderd so expeditiously, that it were Injustice to their Merit and Bravery, not to believe they acted by Order, since they scarce preserved the Appearance of a Defence; and to those who at that Time had sent an Ambassador extraordinary to the *French* Camp. And we cannot suppose them so lost to Policy, as to design with Words to stop the Vigour

of *France*, or talk to silence the Thunder that ruined their Barrier : No, a subsequent Occurrence has sufficiently unveiled that mystical Negociation. Did not the *French* this last Winter blow up the Fortifications of *Menin*, and is it not reported and believed that Preparations are making, for doing the same to those of *Ipres*? The World then can no longer doubt, but Mr. *Wafenaer* consented those Towns should be taken, with a *Proviso* they should be demolished. The Burthen of supporting these Towns lay so heavy on the *D---h*, that they seized with Eagerness the first plausible Occasion to get quit of them : and letting them fall to the *French*, procured their Demolition ; regardless of the common Cause, while it was unattended with their particular Advantage. As no other Motive but this, can account for the Conduct of the *D---ch*, so none other can account for that of the *French* ; for if their Views are upon *Flanders*, can we think they would chuse to dismantle Forts, the best situated and adapted to *prosecute that Conquest*, or
secure

secure it? Or can we think them so ignorant not to know, that when a Peace is to be made, the more they have in their Hands, the more advantageous will be the Terms that will be granted them, and that *Menin* and *Ipres* would have weighed in their Ballance, against any adequate Demand on our Side.

If therefore it is highly probable, that the late Miscarriage flowed from that Source, what Reason have we to think, that our Expectations will now be any better answered, while embarked on the same Bottom with the same Confederates? Can we presume it from *any Alteration* in our *Measures*, or from any Alteration in *theirs*? Have not our Ministers in foreign Courts, expressly, and by Order declared, that in Consequence of the Change of Men, (or rather of a Man) no Change of Measures was intended? and in Fact, are not the same Measures pursued? Is it not thought proper under this Administration, as well as under the last, to prosecute the War against *France*, by our Armies on the Continent?

Nay,

Nay, do they not go further, is not the Subsidy of the Queen of *Hungary* augmented from 300 to 500,000 l. Have they not extended their Liberality to other Princes in *Germany*, and have not they who preached aloud for *British Measures only*, unconnected with the Affairs of the Continent and *Germany*, now lavish'd our Treasures on other foreign Princes, nay, what is more on other *German* Princes. 'Tis true indeed, the Troops of *Hanover* are no more retained in the Pay of *Britain*. But is not our Army to be assisted by such a Number of Mercenaries, as will raise the *British* Contingent to 40,000. And where is the real Difference, whether *British* Money is paid to *Hanover* Mercenaries or to *S---n*, or others, to carry on a Land War on the Continent. If any Difference is at all, I think it is plainly in Favour of the *Hanoverians*. For not to mention the Goodness and Discipline of the Troops, in which to say the least, they are inferiour to none; it is most certain that being under the same Head, they may be the more depended on:

on: and that a certain Dependance is not to be had on all Mercenaries, Experience of past Time shows. Is it not known that a Backwardness shown by the *Danes*, to concurr with our Troops till some Scruples were removed, encouraged the *French* to hazard the Battle of *Ramellies*, and might have ruined our Troops, at least have prevented the total Overthrow of theirs, if the Prudence of the Duke of *Marlborough*, and the Zeal of the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, had not removed the Cause of Complaint, the Evening before the Engagement, in which these Troops had no small Share. And is it not known, how few of these mercenary Gentlemen followed the Duke of *Ormond*, at his Separation from *Eugene*. This Separation is not our Business to justify; but still he was the *British* General, and they, as Mercenaries, oblig'd to obey him. But they showed the Vanity of that Obligation, when inconsistent with the private Interest or Inclination of their own Masters. But since the Heats of *Hanover* are now laid, let me not revive them, may the Cause, if
any

any, be forgotten, and the *Fomenters*, whatever their Views, be forgiven. Let us see if any Conduct in *H——d* speaks any Alteration there more than here. Has the Change of our Administration such Weight there, as to induce them in Pursuance of Treaties the most solemn, and between Nations the most connected by Interest, to declare War against *France*; to induce them to wipe off from the Republic, the Stain of Breach of Faith, that Stain with which the public *Foe* is so justly and greatly blackened. For small is the Difference between refusing to execute, what by Treaties is enjoin'd, and acting in Opposition to it. At least in each Respect there is a manifest Violation, of Faith and Disregard to Engagements. But it is said, they will exert their Strength in our Cause as heartily and fully, as if principally concerned in it. That might do, if their late Conduct had not taught us what Dependance is to be had on Appearance and Promises; for have they not made the same Promises these two Years? Their Troops in the Field last Campaign,

Campaign, were pretty near as numerous as they are expected to be in the ensuing. And what Assurance have now given that the Policy they then held, will not direct them now? They send their Troops to the Field 'tis true, but reserve to themselves the Direction of the Manner of their acting, and no past Behaviour gives us Reason to be so sanguine as to think that these Directions will advance the common Interest. Nay, what is more, have they not prevailed in Choice of a General, than which nothing was of more Consequence to them, and nothing should have been more strenuously resisted by us. And whatever Opinion the World may have conceived of Mr. *Koningseg*, he can't but be sensible to whom he owes the Command, and must therefore show a particular Byass to their Sentiments; nay it is not improbable, but he was well acquainted with what was to be expected from him, when he got the Command. This Consideration imports every *Briton* the more, as Objections were made to a General of our own, who undoubtedly

stands first in the Rank of Warriors of his Country, if not of all *Europe*; I need not say I mean the E. of *St-r.* It is as far from my Design as below my Abilities, to show how he is capacitated for this Command, to show how the *French* may be overcome by one, whom *Marlborough* honoured with his Friendship and Confidence, and to whose Inspection *Eugene* submitted his Schemes: nor is it needful. The very Reason given why he should not, proves sufficiently that he should. For he is a *rash General*, that is to say because he is a *fighting General*, and *fighting is not to their Purpose*. They know his Honour too severe to be restrain'd by any indirect Means, or any indirect End, from Action, and therefore could not trust him with a Power that might force them to beat *France*, and hurry them into a War with their Friends. And give me leave to add, they know too much of his Ability in the Cabinet, to think in Earnest that his Courage will not be directed by Conduct, and that Wisdom and Prudence will desert him

in

in the Field, which never deserted him any where else? 'Tis his enterprising Genius so little agreeable to their peaceable Intentions which they dread; That Genius, which when the Confederates lay slumbering out the last Campaign, sent them over a Plan to crush the Enemy in the Head, and proceed to *Paris*. Vain Thought, as if any Hand but his own could execute the Plan of his Head. Need I tell the Result, the Plan was disregarded and none else took Place.— No Wonder then that he is now laid aside, who undoubtedly would attempt what he formerly proposed. As he knows none so well what the *French* can do, and how they can be beat, I do not think it Presumption in saying, his *unrestrained Aims* could execute his Scheme, and plant the *English* Flag on the Ramparts of *Paris*. If the Misconduct of the two last Campaigns was owing to too little Regard they had to the *B—sh* Commanders, what is to be expected from the next, when Shame to *Britain*, Foreigners will Lord it uncontroll'd? But it may now be said, that the

Objection of *D---b* Influence, or Direction in the Field, now falls to the Ground, by the Nomination of his R. H. to the supreme Command. Though I have all the Honour and Veneration for that gallant Youth, which his Merit can claim, though I am convinced his every Action will do Honour to the Noble Blood whence he sprung, and the Air he first breathed; yet it is to be considered, whether Custom and Prudence do not require an old General to be appointed his Assistant *ad Latus*, to supply with Advice the Want of Experience. That this can be no Disgrace to the *D-ke*, appears by its being done to the young Hero of *Lorain*. 'Twas in this Capacity that *Khevenbulla* won Laurels for the Brow of his Pupil; that *Traun* pass'd the *Rhine* gloriously, and more furiously repass'd it, and drove *Prussia* out of *Bohemia*, to add Honour to the brave *Charles*. The Notion then is not chimerical that in this Capacity will *Koningseg* command *C-----d*. And if I may be permitted the Suppositions, perhaps his R. H. was rais'd to the
nominal

nominal Command, meerly to avoid the glaring Disgraces and Inconveniences of having the Troops command by a Foreigner.

There remains a Reason as urgent as any, to think the *Dutch* are no more sincere now than formerly; and that is, that if they are to act in earnest, they may depend on it that *France* will *declare* against them. For it can never be presumed, they will suffer all Disadvantages of having *Holland* for her Enemy, without any of the Advantages. That she will bear the Strength of their Arms, with plundering or destroying their Trade. And as that must be the necessary Consequence, I am persuaded, were they in Earnest, they would *now* pay the Compliment to *England* of declaring War, in Pursuance of Treaties, and not wait 'till forced to do it by *France*.

As to unravel this, is of the utmost Importance to *Britons* at this Juncture, I hope these subsequent Articles will raise a Desire of having the Affair brought to light, and the rather as it is evident from its having
lain

*The End of last
Campaign.*

lain so long dormant, that without the Interposition of the Public, the Veil of Oblivion will be thrown over it. That it may be known what, or if any Answer was returned from the *Hague*, when the Conduct of an ENGLISHMAN is impeached, it ought to be cleared to the World, or condemned by his Countrymen; and public Enquiries seem to be the only Means now left, to restore the military and naval Honour of *Britain*, to its ancient Lustre.

*Articles of Accusation, with the Answers
to them.*

ARTICLE. I. That the Right Wing of of the Army broke up the 17th of *October*, at *Drogen*, in an unexpected, abrupt and unconcerted Manner, and marched, much to the Surprise of the Duke of *Aremberg*, the Court of *Brussels*, the *Dutch* Generals and the Republic.

Answer. On the 16th of *October* in the Morning, the General of the *British* Horse
came

came to Marshal *Wade*, at the Camp at *Drongen*, representing the distress'd Condition of the Cavalry, both Men and Horses were in, from the heavy Rains and Storms; the Men's Tents being so much torn, that it was not possible to pitch them, that their Horses stood up to their Knees in Water, and their Forage quite spoild by the heavy Rain, that had fallen for three Days together, and still continued with great Violence; desiring therefore that they might be order'd into Winter Quarters, to prevent the total Destruction of that Body. Representations were likewise made here by the Generals of the Foot, in Regard to their Tents being in the same Condition. Numbers of their Men being sent daily to the Hospital, occasioned by the excessive bad Weather. But the Marshal would not consent to their going into Winter Quarters, till he had the Approbation of the Duke of *Aremberg*; for which Purpose he sent the Quarter Master General, and Adjutant General to the Duke, to acquaint him with the Situation the Troops were in, desiring

desiring his Approbation for their going in-
to Winter Quarters, beginning with the
British Cavalry who were to quarter in
Brussels, as the Operations of the Cam-
paign were entirely at an End. A quarter
of an Hour after these Gentlemen set out
with the said Message, Major General *Gem-
mingem* Quarter Master General of the *Aus-
trians* arrived at the Marshal's Quarters
from the Duke's, with a Message to the
same Purpose, that the excessive bad Wea-
ther made it necessary, that the Troops
should march into Winter Quarters. To
which the Marshal answered, that he agreed
perfectly with the Duke, in the Necessity
of marching directly into Quarters, and had
sent the Quarter Master General and Adjutant
General, to his Highness with the
same Proposals, and was glad to find that
the Duke agreed with him in his Senti-
ments, for the Preservation of the Troops.
The Quarter Master, and Adjutant Gene-
rals on their Return to the Marshal, ac-
quainted him that they had delivered his
Message to the Duke, in the Presence of
Barons

Barons *Cromstrom* and *Ginkel*, whose Troops being equally in the same bad Condition, had no Objection to the March of the Troops, but desired, that Brigadier *Bland* would draw out a Disposition, for the March of the Right Wing, and sign it, that the Left Wing might not interfere in the same March; which he accordingly did and delivered it to the Duke of *Aremberg*, of which General *Cromstrom* took a Copy. Can this be called breaking up in abrupt, unexpected and unconcerted Manner?

ARTICLE II. That the Winter Quarters of the *English* were of their own choosing, and not previously concerted with the Allies.

Answer. About the 20th of *September*, N. S. at the Camp on the Plains of *Lisle*, the Duke of *Aremberg* proposed to the Marshal and *Dutch* Generals, to give in a List of the Places, they intended for Winter Quarters, that the necessary Preparation might be made for their Reception, which was accordingly done, and delivered to the Duke, about the 25th of the same Month,

a Copy of which Disposition is hereto annexed, and it will be still further corroborated, by the Marshal's Letter to Lord G---t-r-t, of the 27th of the said Month. How then can it be said with Justice, that the settling the Winter Quarters was not previously concerted with the Allies, or that they were of their own choosing, since the five Battalions proposed to be quartered at *Brussels*, were sent to Quarters in *Ghent* and *Bruges*?

ARTICLE III. That these Winter Quarters were determined, before the Court of *Brussels* could make any Provision or Disposition for the Reception of the Troops.

Answer. That as soon as the Winter Quarters were settled, the Marshal gave Orders for erecting Magazines of Forage, and wrote circular Letters to the Magistrates of *Ostend*, *Bruges*, *Ghent* and *Brussels* to provide Quarters and Hospitals, for the Number of Troops destined for each of these Places, and received Answers from each, that from *Brussels*, which is most complain'd of, being here annexed, which
proves

proves that they were thoroughly advised of the March of our Troops thither; and when General *Honeywood* and Lord *Albemarle* arrived there with their Division, they found every thing in such a Readiness, that in an Hour's Time the Troops were all settled in their Quarters. This proves the Fallacy of their Assertion.

ARTICLE IV. That no general Plan of Repartition of the Garrisons, or of the Routes, by which the Troops were to file off to them, was made.

Answer. If Routes were not prepared, it was the Fault of those Persons, whose Business it was to give them, the Quarter Master General having wrote by the Marshal's Order, a Week before to Count *Koningsberg* Enquire about it, but never received an Answer. However no Inconvenience could arise from this, as the *British* Troops lay within a Day's March of their Quarters, except those designed for *Brussels*, which was only two Days, nor could any other Troops interfere, as it was agreed with the *Austrian* and *Dutch* Generals, that

they should proceed first to march to their Quarters, therefore this frivolous Imputation is without Grounds.

ARTICLE V. That by this Manner of proceeding, the Troops of the Queen and the Republic were exposed to any Insults, on the Part of the *French*, and to visible Risk, by being abandon'd and left to shift for themselves, with the Enemy at but two Marches from them.

Answered. In answer to this Article, it is necessary to premise, that when the Duke of *Aremberg*, with the Barons *Ginkel* and *Cromstrom*, could not be prevailed upon to cross the *Lis*, pursuant to their own Projects, signed under their own Hands, the Marshal asked them what they proposed to do? On which Baron *Cromstrom* (the principal Complainant) laying a Map on the Table, said, we have nothing now to do, but to march near *Ghent*, from whence we can receive our Forage, placing our Right to the *Lis*, and our Left to the *Sebeld*. The Marshal then told them, he thought that was putting an End not only to their
own

own Project, but to the Campaign, which they allowed, and two Days after, the Duke sent Baron *Gemmingen* to the Marshal, about seven in the Evening, to acquaint him, that for Want of Forage, the *Austrian* and *Dutch* Troops, must march to the Camp they had pitched upon near *Ghent*, without having previously consulted him on a Separation of that Importance, Count *Saxe's* Army being at that Time, but a short Days March from the Right Wing, and the Left Wing accordingly marched to the Camp, at *St. Deny's*, near *Ghent*. This was really abandoning the Right Wing, and leaving them to shift for themselves. However that did not alter the Marshal's Resolutions of passing the *Lis* at *Deynse*, with twelve Battalions and eight Squadrons of Dragoons, to cover the March of the rest of the Right Wing, who pass'd the *Lis*, over two Bridges at *Bachlen* and *Duerlod*, two Days after their Separation. And altho' the Marshal had great Reason to animadvert on it, in his Letters to the Ministers, yet he never made any Complaint,

plaint, least it might create an Uneasiness betwixt the Nations. As to the Left Wing being exposed to any Insults of the *French*, in their Camp under the Walls of *Ghent*, and eight Leagues from the Enemy, encamped on the other Side of the *Lis*, and then actually separating their Troops, no such Apprehension ever entered into the Thought of any Officer, of either Wing, and when the Duke of *Anemburg*, the Barons *Ginkel* and *Cromstrom* did the Marshal the Honour to visit him at *Ghent*, they never so much as gave him the least Hint of their running any Risque, neither cou'd the Army separate in any other manner, than what they did, being obliged to keep the Causeway, all other Roads being rendered impassable at that Time. The Marshal omits mentioning the great Industry used, to misrepresent all his Actions during the Campaign at *Brussels*, the *Hague* and *London*, but was most surpriz'd that the first Account of the last Cavil came from *Namur*, by a Letter wrote by General *Cromstrom* to General *Colier*, who showed it to

Lord

Lord J. S-----He. For what Smilster Ends
 this Clamour has been raised, these false,
 absurd and scandalous Misrepresentations dis-
 pers'd abroad, let the Author of them an-
 swer, but sure it is, the Misunderstandings
 betwixt *England* and *Holland*, can be cal-
 culated only for the Ruin of the Queen's
 Affairs, and of the common Cause.


The Magistrates of *Brussels* Letter referred
 to above.

MONSIEUR,

A La Reception de la Lettre du 12; dont
 V. E. nous a honorez nous avons au-
 fistot communique son Contenu a celui, qui a
 la Direction du Logement des Troupes, qui
 viendront en Quartier d'Hiver en cette Ville.
 Il ne manquera pas de prendre toutes les mea-
 sures Convenables a cette Occasion, au Desire
 et Contentment de votre Excellence. Et nous
 lui sommes tres obligees des Offres, gracieuses
 qui la Bontè de nous faire en lui Assu-
 rent, que nous ne manquerons Point duffi de
 Porter toutes nos Attentions a ce que peut
 contribuer

*contribuer a l'Avantage, de la Cause com-
mune en general, & a sa Satisfaction en par-
ticulier; dans ces Sentiments nous avons l'Ho-
neur, d'etre avec Respect, &c. Les Magis-
trates de la Ville de Brussels; 16 October.*

S I R,



UPON Receipt of your Excellency's
Letter of the 12th, we immediately
communicated the Contents to the Person,
who has the Direction of settling the
Troops, who are to come to Winter Quar-
ters in this City. Nothing shall be wanting
to take all proper Measures, according to
the Desire, and to the Satisfaction of your
Excellency; we are mightily oblig'd to you
for the good Offices you was pleas'd to do us,
assuring you at the same time, that we shall
not be wanting on our Part, to make it our
whole Endeavour, to contribute all in our
Power for the Advantage of the general
Cause, and to your Satisfaction in particular.
In these Sentiments we have the Honour,
to be with all Respect, &c. *Brussels, 16th
of October, N. S.*

F I N I S.

